Development in Arabic Nations

One reading that we did not particularly focus on. but which provides a healthy amount of debatable issues is Tamara Coffman Wittes' article on the three movements of Islamic religion, and how this ties into the development of the broader Islamic region. I find it fascinating that even though Islam, much like ethnic violence, is bundled into a broad categorization without much in depth perception. In reality however, Islamic nations and states have had very different developmental experiences, and I think the reason we don't pay attention to them so much is because they have either been very successful or they are our sworn enemies. In both cases, ignorance is not bliss, and I would argue that it is in fact detrimental to ignore. The successful Islamic states are mostly the ones that have a rich wealth of resources and can capitalize on them, such as Saudi Arabia, which is one of 3 nations in the world that is still a declared non-democratic state, The United Arab Emirates, most notably Abu Dhabi and Dubai, as well as Qatar, Bahrain and brunei, but also Malaysia and Indonesia. However, the latter ones specifically have not been successful due their oil wealth but have managed to industrialize through other means. When it comes to regime type and regime change, the relative wealth of the population as a result of the amazing amounts of oil have led to a situation mimicking the Chinese social contract, which is that the authoritarian power structures remain in place as long as the economic prosperity of the people is guaranteed. This is why there is still a kalif ruling over Abu Dhabi, even though that term seems like something from a medieval history class.
The unsuccessful states present a more interesting dilemma, and it is debatable whether the nature of Islam has truly contributed to their predicament. I will broadly include states such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, large parts of the Maghreb excluding Egypt, the central Asian states and in some way or other India. These states with some notable exceptions have been in a persistent deadlock of misery and stagnation since the end of colonialism left them with autonomy. Their political systems are a mess, which is why most of them have diverted to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime types. Here Tamara Coffman Wittes comes in: does the application of Islam in different ways affect the nature of a regime in that country? Or, since fundamentalist Islam can be seen as an international phenomenon, does the effect of Islam on the population have any significant repercussion on their ability to become democratic? These are questions that merit investigation. When looking precisely at the differences in these countries one begins to notice patterns such as extreme economic disparity leading to poverty, deep sectarian or ethnic cleavages, language barriers, geographic boundaries, interstate ethnic bonds, etc, which are all highly qualified elements of consideration. So the argument that Islam and its application as a cause could potentially be replaced by the application of Islam as an effect. The mistaken assumption that Islam causes economic misery and thus reverts to fundamentalist violence needs to be revisited and the true causes of the failures of these states more closely examined. There is potential: Kuwait serves as almost a model Islamic nation with a peaceful and effective constitutional monarchy that has brought about important social, economic and religious shifts. If they can do it, why can't the other guys?