The Foundations of Russia's Autocracy

Professor King asked a key question that contains important implications for post-communist analysis: Is Russia a special case? In other words, does Russia, once the largest and most integral republic of the USSR, posses a special set of circumstances differing from any of the other states formerly located behind the Iron Curtain? I believe that Russia does constitute a special case, and the autocratic regime led by Vladimir Putin pulls some of its legitimacy from sources altogether absent in other post-communist autocracies. As the originating force behind the USSR, Russians confronted arguably the greatest political and psychological upheaval with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the collapse of their guiding ideology. Putin’s relatively unquestioned authority arises from Russia’s unsuccessful transition from communism, as well as his ability to reclaim national pride and usher in a new era of political and economic stability.

Pierre Hassner argues in “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy” that the country did not transition well following the collapse of communism as the basis of its political and economic system. Yeltsin’s government instituted some elements of democracy, but even under his government there was “no equality and no real rule of law; privatization amounted to a seizure of public wealth by the oligarchs” (Hassner 4). Russia, in this respect, is not unlike states that formed semi-autocratic governments in the post-communist era, including the Ukraine, Georgia, and Yugoslavia. At the same time, Michael McFaul’s “Transitions from Postcommunism” proposes sources of the latter countries’ successful transitions to democracy that are unlikely to arise in Russia. These include the presence of an unpopular incumbent, an adequately independent media, and an opposition that is mobilized enough to protest undemocratic elections. These factors do not emerge in Russia. Putin remains sufficiently popular in his country, and he imposes severe restrictions on the media (one need only look to the recent suspicious death of journalist Anna Politkovskaya). Moreover, civil society remains cripplingly weak. With such a weak civil society, Russia is unlikely to develop political organizations along the lines of “Our Ukraine” or the Serbian student group Otpur. Russia lacks sufficient political opposition to protest electoral fraud.

Russians, unlike the Serb or Ukrainian protestors, allow the autocratic regime to function with minimal protest. They have unique reasons for allowing a strong state. Hassner explains the willingness of citizens to acquiesce to an authoritarian regime by describing the humiliation and resentment of ordinary Russians following the breakup of the federation in which they effectively held the largest stake. Having lost their empire, they are searching for a new role in the global community. Vladimir Putin is the first leader who gives Russians pride in their country following the collapse of the USSR. Americans may not understand why Putin remains popular among ordinary Russians, but important consideration must be given to the Russian perception of the regime. The citizens’ view of their government determines the nature of their domestic politics, which allows for a multitude of autocratic practices. I agree with Hassner’s explanation of the source of Putin’s popularity. While in principle the people condemn the government’s human rights violations and favor democracy, they are grateful to Putin for restoring Russia’s international power and authority.

The Russian people credit Putin in particular with restoring the country’s dignity. Regardless of electoral results, Putin possesses other sources of legitimacy. First, he is a charismatic leader. As Professor King noted, he rose to power as a young and energetic leader. He brought confidence back to the citizens of Russia, which makes them more willing to accept his consolidation of “vertical” power. Moreover, Putin possesses performance legitimacy. Following Putin’s accession to the presidency, Russia became more politically and economically stable. Putin achieved success in Chechnya where Yeltsin had failed. As a result of its oil resources and newly assertive foreign policy, Russia gained more power in the region, and Putin led the charge for Russia to reclaim its place as an elite power in the international community. Former Polish President Kwasniewski, discussing the most recent aggressive statements coming out of Russia, expressed essentially the same view – that Russia is attempting to define itself as a superpower once again, impeding on the sovereignty of its former colonies and threatening Western states in the process. A significant percentage of the Russian people approve of leaders who reassert their country’s strength, regardless of the means they use to achieve political office. Russia’s former power, therefore, makes Russia a “special case” among the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. Because of its distinct circumstances, the country faces further challenges in achieving a democratic breakthrough.

Russia is unique among post-communist states – after all, it was once the heart of the Soviet Empire. The discontent with authoritarianism is much less pronounced, and this special characteristic of Russia gives rise to a stable autocratic regime. Exactly what changes must manifest in society to generate political liberalization is the next question facing democracy proponents in the former empire.