Legacies of the Communist System

One of the key distinguishing features between regime types is their attitude toward civil society. From an American perspective, in which the ideal of pluralism is firmly ingrained, I think there is a definite inclination to automatically evaluate other countries in terms of how close they come to this ideal. It can be difficult to imagine any alternative to pluralism as a viable or just model, because I think instinctively most Americans would view this as a repression of individual opinions. But is active civic participation necessary to good governance? And can we make normative judgments about the freedom of a country whose people choose not to actively participate in civil society? The readings this week addressed these issues in light of Communism’s impact on the politics of postcommunist nations.

In “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society,” Marc Morjé Howard argues that the weak civil society characterizing postcommunist countries is neither conducive nor destructive to democratic governance. While the democratic process clearly benefits from the aggregation of opinions, interests, and preferences of a vibrant civil society, a weak civil society also means that “the overthrow of existing democratic regimes by movements with broad-based and active popular support” (Howard 164) is very unlikely. This situation leads to a relatively stable yet stagnant system.

But in the absence of effective forums for expressing opposition to government action, it would seem that the members of the ruling elite are left with undue latitude for making decisions. While the broad-based overthrow of democratic regimes may not occur, there seems to be little to prevent the decay of democratic institutions from the inside, leading to a situation where democratic institutions are formally in place but where the democratic process does not truly occur. What’s to distinguish this from the “gray-zone” regimes we previously discussed? Under true authoritarian regimes (or one of the many hybrid regimes with authoritarian elements) pluralist activity directly challenging the government is discouraged. But in terms of the power of the government there would seem to be very little difference in a country where pluralist activity simply does not occur through the citizens’ own choice.

This theme emerges in “Russia’s Transition to Autocracy.” Pierre Hassner writes that a majority of the people in Russia, even in spite of questionable opinion polls, still support Putin. According to Putin’s supporters, he is not hostile to pluralism, but merely supports a different and equally imperfect model, “sovereign democracy,” which retains some elements of totalitarianism. It would seem according to this characterization that the Russian people for the most part welcome an increased display of governmental power.

Where does this leave us in terms of evaluating the legitimacy of postcommunist systems? To judge them in terms of adherence to a pluralist model is perhaps to make an undue normative judgment about political systems, especially in light of the fact that people in postcommunist countries don’t seem to want to participate in civil society. But the concern remains that in countries where people do not actively express opposition to their government there is the danger of degeneration to a system of unchecked governmental repression.